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FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROTECTION: IS
INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION AN ANSWER?
EARL SNYDER*
There seems to be considerable consensus-indeed, one might
say virtual unanimity--on the position that one of the deterrents
to a greater flow of investment capital to newly developing countries
is the high incidence of non-business risk (e.g., "creeping" or out-
right expropriation without adequate, prompt and effective com-
pensation, currency controls and inconvertibility, export and import
controls, political and social instability).' This deterrent does not
admit a single, all-encompassing solution. It has been attacked
(or attempts have been made to attack it) from several different
viewpoints.
One viewpoint is termed unilateral. This includes assurances
by newly developing countries (constitutional provisions, statutory
enactments, executive policy statements) that private foreign in-
vestment will be allowed to develop safe from harassment and
confiscation within the framework of the economy of the country
in which the investment is made.2 (Investment guarantees by the
government of the capital exporter also fall within the ambit of this
concept.)
A second-almost corollary of the first-is the bilateral approach.
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar; Barrister-at-Law, Gray's Inn;
chairman, Subcommittee on Protection of Private Foreign Investment, Fed-
eral Bar Association; member, Committee on International Trade and In-
vestment, American Bar Association; member, Committee on International
Arbitration Procedure for Protection of Investments Abroad, International
Bar Association.
1 See, e.g., INT'L L. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 84 (1960); Domke, The Arbitration of Inter-
national Investment Controversies, in Am. Soc'Y INT'L L., SECOND INTER-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW CONFERENCE 1, 2 (1958); The Promotion of
the International Flow of Private Capital, U.N. EcoSoc COUNCIL OFF. REc.
29th Sess., Agenda Item No. 5, at 63 (E/3325) (1960) [hereinafter cited as
U.N. Doc. No. E/3325]; address by Lord Shawcross, Societe Royale d'Eco-
nomie Politique de Belgique, December 15, 1959; address by the Prime
Minister of Malaya, United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and
the Far East, March 5, 1958; cf. MYRDAL, AN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 109-
10 (1956). Another important deterrent is, of course, lack of broad domestic
markets in newly developing countries assuring reasonable prospects of
profitability of large scale investments. See, e.g., Hazerd, Latin America's
Capital Requirements, in [1958] PRoc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 205, 207.
'U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 64-66.
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For example, where an investment guaranty scheme is embodied
in a treaty between capital exporting and importing states, the con-
cept becomes bilateral. Indeed, any agreement between two states
affording an opportunity for and protection of private foreign in-
vestment is encompassed within this approach.'
The third approach is a multilateral one. It envisages a code
or convention or agreement among a group of capital exporting and
importing states (ideally, the convention would be ecumenical) to
facilitate the flow of private investment capital from those countries
having it to those countries needing it.' There are those attempting
to advance this concept;5 there are those who believe it will not bear
fruit in the foreseeable future.'
Perhaps the overweighing conclusion gleaned from a careful
consideration of these approaches is this: no matter what method
is adopted to facilitate the flow of private investment capital to
newly developing countries, there will be controversies and disputes.
This is inevitable. Any other view is simply a pathological belief
in the occurrance of the impossible. There must be means (other
than diplomacy, mediation or conciliation) by which these disputes
can be resolved. Perhaps institutionalizing the means is wise; good
intentions have not been enough in the past.
If there is an institutional means by which foreign investment
disputes can be speedily, impartially and equitably decided-and
equally important, the decision can be enforced without unconscion-
able delay and expense-would there not follow a greater flow of
private foreign investment to newly developing nations ?7 Would
not the certainty that disputes involving foreign investment will
be fairly and expeditiously settled, encourage foreign investment in
8 Id. at 70-71.
' INTERNATIONAL CH1AMBER OF COMMERcE Doc. No. 111/100, at 4 (1960);
U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 71-76.
E.g., International Chamber of Commerce; International Association for
the Promotion and Protection of Private Foreign Investments; British Par-
liamentary Group for World Government; Organization of Economic Coop-
eration and Development; Council of Europe.
'See, e.g., RumIN, PnrvATE FOEIGN INVESTMENT 82-83 (1956) ; Metzger,
Multilateral Conventions for the Protection of Private Foreign Investment,
9 J. PuB. L. 133, 134 (1960); Snyder, Protection of Private Foreign Invest-
ment: Examination and Appraisal, 10 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 469, 490 (1961) ;
Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Invest-
nent: Present United States Practice, 5 AM. J. CoMp. L. 229, 240 (1956).
" Compare, Domke, supra note 1, at 1; Haight, Some Legal Aspects of
Private Investments in the Middle East, in AM. Soc'Y INT'L L., SECOND
INTERNATIONAL LAW CoNFERENcE 1, 16-17 (1958).
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newly developing countries, on the one hand; and, on the other,
would it not encourage those countries to be more thoughtful in
their treatment of foreign investment?
Foreign investors are naturally reluctant to attempt to adjust
their grievances before a tribunal of the state allegedly causing the
grievance-or in which the grievance arises. By the same token,
a state which is a party to a grievance is reluctant to have its rights
adjudicated by a tribunal of the state of which the foreign investor
is a national.8
This leads ineluctably to settlement of disputes "under a tribunal
or system of tribunals which will command general confidence as to
the fairness of their judgments and whose procedure will be sup-
ported by a public opinion which will not tolerate a departure from
them."'  This concept is not new nor revolutionary."°
WHY ARBITRATION?
Arbitration has been defined as "the voluntary submission of a
dispute by the interested parties to a disinterested person or persons
for final determination."" It has not always been considered a
desirable answer to the problem of how to speedily, impartially and
equitably resolve commercial disputes. Commentators, as well as
courts, were hostile to it.'" Courts based their hostility on the
8 INT'L L. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE FORTIETH CONFERENCE 174-75 (Amster-
dam 1938): "[T]he indispensable objectivity and impartiality [of national
courts] are sometimes jeopardized by considerations of national interest;
this occurs especially in cases in which considerable interests are at stake."
'Address by Herbert Brownell, Jr. (then U.S. Attorney General), Ameri-
can Bar Association Convention, London, July 24, 1957. Compare address
by Lord Shawcross, Societe Royale d'Economie Politique de Belgique, De-
cember 15, 1959. Contra, Kopelmanas, The Settlement of Disputes in Inter-
national Trade, 61 COLT M. L. REv. 384 (1961): "An exaggerated idea of
the relative importance of authoritative procedure in settlement of disputes
has encouraged the position that the progress of international lav depends
mainly on establishing such international procedure. The recent evolution
of international society shows, however, that better organization of inter-
national relations is more readily and efficiently obtained through concerted
action by the subjects of international law. An effort to impose on them a
supranational system for the settlement of disputes would, in the present
inorganic stage of the international society, be premature."
'0 See, e.g., Sohn, Proposal for the Establishment of a System of Inter-
national Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 63 (Domke ed.
1958).
"
1 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES 3
(1954).
" See, e.g., Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law: Compulsion as
Applied to a Voluntary Proceeding, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1258 (1933).
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assertion that it "ousts the jurisdiction of the court." 3 There is
some reason to believe the basis for this hostility initially was a
pragmatic one; if the court's business decreased, the judge's income
likewise decreased. 14
There is today, however, a growing body of informed opinion
asserting that impartial transnational arbitration 5 is the most fea-
sible single means of solving disputes concerning foreign private
investment, promoting the flow of capital to newly developing coun-
tries, and protecting that capital from harassment and expropria-
tion without prompt, adequate and effective compensation.'" Tan-
"S Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils.K.B. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1796).
"Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration--International and Interstate As-
pects, 43 YALE L.J. 716, 721 (1934).
" The writer prefers "transnational arbitration" to "international arbitra-
tion." See JEsSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAw 32 (1956): "A Chile or an Indo-
nesia feels poor for want of capital to develop its internal economy. The
problems arising from these current yearnings or demands of the under-
developed countries must be described as transnational rather than merely
international, since they involve the relations of, say, Indonesia not only to the
United States for example but also to the private sources of American capital
and to such intergovernmental organizations as the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development." See also id. at 13-14, 78.
" See, e.g., U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 77: "This dilemma has led to the
suggestion that alternative recourse be provided for such disputes before an
international arbitral body. Arbitration has increasingly become a favorite
method for resolving disputes arising in business relations." See also com-
ments by Professor Louis B. Sohn, New York Regional Meeting, American
Society of International Law, March 2, 1961, in AM. Soc'Y INT'L L., REPORT
OF THE- NEW YORuK REGIONAL MEETING 9-10 (1961): "It is in the general
interest of the international community to have clear standards, generally
accepted standards, and to have them applied impartially by an impartial
tribunal. If under-developed countries are not willing to accept impartial
tribunals and international standards they are going to discover that there
is not going to be investment in them, and, as a result, their development is
going to suffer"; BRITISH PARLIAMENT GROUP FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT,
A WORLD INVESTMENT CONVENTION? 18 (1959): "Every participating state
would bind itself to accept recourse to an Arbitration Tribunal, if a dispute
should arise out of the Convention"; U.N. Doc. No. E/AC.6/ SR.282, at 5
(1960) (statement of Undersecretary, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, United Nations): "[D]espite some reservations and hesitations,
there was a clear trend in favor of some means of arbitration to deal with
possible disputes between public authorities and foreign investors"; id. at 8
(statement of representative, International Chamber of Commerce); id. at
9 (statement of Netherlands' delegate to EcoSoc); id. at 14 (statement of
Afghanistan's delegate to EcoSoc) ; id. at 20 (statement of United Kingdom's
delegate to EcoSoc). Contra, id. at 11 (statement of Russian delegate to
EcoSoc). For the formless view of the United States' delegate, see id. at 19:
"The question of an international convention on arbitration of disputes posed
. .. difficulties. . . ." [A]nd the extension of arbitration procedures to
disputes arising between private investors and governments raised still more
complex questions ......
The Association for the Protection of Private Foreign Investments has
prepared, as part of its draft international investment protection code, an
[Vol. 40
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gentially, some business leaders are embracing the belief that arbi-
tration is a useful tool in the conduct of international business."
This seems logical. Differences of opinion concerning private
foreign investment must be quickly and impartially resolved to
maintain amicable relations between a foreign investor and the coun-
try of investment. Arbitration can be-and in virtually every in-
stance is-less cumbersome and speedier than judicial settlement of
disputes. Nor is it so rigidly proscribed by law. Moreover, it is
concerned more with common sense and justice and less with political
nuances than diplomacy, mediation or conciliation."" Arbitral tri-
bunals can take into account the needs of investment and rational
standards of commercial fairness. 9
In short, arbitration furnishes the most satisfactory means for
parties who are nationals of different states (and subject to differing
systems of law) to solve equitably differences arising out of their
investment dealings. It allows a relatively speedy and flexible
procedure that seems unattainable by overworked courts; it permits
an imprimatur of impartiality virtually unobtainable in courts of a
particular state; it allows an individual or business entity to be a
party to the proceeding; it obviates a state's espousing a dispute of
its national.2"
annex providing for an arbitral tribunal. The Proposed Convention to
Protect Private Foreign Investment: A Round Table, 9 J. PuB. L. 115, 118(1960). The International Bar Association, at both its Seventh Conference
at Cologne, July 1958, and its Eight Conference at Salzburg, July 1960,
passed resolutions to consider establishing new international institutions to
settle disputes concerning property rights and interests of aliens-at its 1962
Conference in Edinburgh a Committee on International Arbitration Proce-
dure for the Protection of Investments Abroad will consider this matter fur-
ther. The International Law Association is working on the problem through
its Committee on Nationalization and Foreign Investment. Compare Legis-
lative Decree 2687 of Oct. 31, 1953, art. 12 (Greece) (investment and pro-
tection of foreign capital); IBRD, Loan Regs. 3-4, §§7.03, .04 (1961);
INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION, FORTY-SEVENTH INTER-PARLIAMENTARY
CONFERENcE 6 (1958) (resolution II).
7 See, e.g., Rosenthal, A Businessman Looks at Arbitration, in INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 27, 32 (Domke ed. 1958): "Arbitration is
one of the techniques that should have more study and attention from the
business community as a whole than it has received over the years."
18 Wright, Arbitration as a Symbol of Internationalism, in id. at 7-9.10Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart,
71 HARV. L. REv. 630, 637 (1958).
"0 This enlightened step has been urged for decades as a means of keeping
political overtones out of what is almost always a non-political dispute. See,
e.g., Sohn, supra note 10, at 65-73. Compare JEssur, A MODERN LAW OF
NATIONS 15 passim (1948); LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 10-11 passim (1950); U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/96, at 51,
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There is little precedent or past experience in the settlement of
transnational investment disputes by arbitration; on balance, this
may be advantageous. There are few, if any, "still nourished memo-
ries of past disillusionment." 21  This leaves room for bold concepts
and positive implementation. It gives opportunity for institutional
arbitration with permanent administrative machinery; ad hoc tri-
bunals composed of arbitrators of different nationalities chosen from
among knowledgeable, respected, competent jurists and business-
men; adoption of a new, more generally acceptable basis for awards;
and fixed rules of procedure.2 It allows establishment of an appel-
late arbitral tribunal to aid in establishing reasonable uniformity
of awards.
WHY REGIONAL ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS?
It is unrealistic to visualize one arbitral tribunal for settling
disputes arising from foreign investment anywhere in the world.
Such a tribunal would be unwieldy, unworkable and unwise. It
would be unwieldy because to make it representative of all capital
exporting and importing countries and large enough to handle the
expected volume of business, its permanent administrative ma-
chinery and mode of operation would be so all encompassing that
they would be unmanageable. It would be unworkable because the
world is still too large to permit the economical, efficient functioning
of such a tribunal. It would be unwise because newly developing,
sensitively sovereign states would not be content with one tribunal
necessarily farther away from their problems-psychologically and
58 (1957) (International Responsibility Report by F. V. Garcia-Amador,
Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission) : "[T]he alien...
is a true subject of international rights." VON KNIERIEm, THE NuREMBEEG
TRiALS 28-35 (Schmitt transl. 1959), has suggested that the Nuremberg
trials are an example of recognition by the international community that
individuals are subjects not objects of international law. See also INT'L L.
Ass'N, REPORT OF THE THIRTY-EIGHT CONFERENcE 75 (Budapest 1934):
"Professeur DE LA PRADELLE: . .. Quand, en 1920, La Haye, dix juris-
consultes, d~signfs par le Conseil, ont prgpar6 'avant-projet du statut d'une
Cour Permanente de Justice internationale, duex d'entre eux, l'un nferlandais,
'autre franqais, propos~rent de donner A l'individu le droit de saisir directe-
ment la Cour Permanente de Justice internationale. Le huit autres membres
du Comit6, pour des raisons diverses, les unes doctrinales, les autres pra-
tiques, ne jug&rent pas le moment venu de r~aliser cette r~forme."21 Address by Phillip C. Jessup (then Professor and now Judge of the
International Court of Justice), Columbia University Centennial Lecture,
November 8, 1958.
22 Compare Domke, The Arbitration of International Investment Contro-




physically-than they would like; or if it were not, capital exporting
states would inevitably be wary.
An obvious solution lies in the establishment of a system of
regional arbitral tribunals." The regions should (insofar as prac-
ticable) follow geographic and ethnic lines. This would tend to
bring each state not only physically closer to its arbitral tribunal,
but-equally important-practicably and psychologically closer.
Since the permanent administrative personnel would be composed
of nationals of the states of the region, this would give those states
an even greater affinity with the tribunal.
A three-man tribunal in which each of two parties chooses an
arbitrator and the two arbitrators choose an umpire not a national
of, nor of the same nationality as, a party, should suffice. (If there
were more than one party-claimant and more than one party-
respondent, all claimants together choose one arbitrator and all re-
spondents together choose one arbitrator.) A five-man tribunal
might be more desirable in infrequent cases; but, it is submitted, its
desirability, on balance, would not warrant the extra expense.
There is, of course, a very real problem of how to delineate
regions. Based on factors set out in previous paragraphs, it would
seem perhaps reasonable to have a tribunal for: (1) Turkey, Iran,
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, United Arab Republic, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia; (2) remainder of Africa; (3) Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Nepal, India, Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South
Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan, Japan; (4) Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and the rest of Australasia; (5) Europe, Great
"3A somewhat analogous suggestion was made as long ago as 1924 by
members of the Hungarian branch of the International Law Association.
This occurred at the Thirty-Third Conference of the Association in Stock-
holm, Sweden. The suggestion was renewed (in different form) in 1934 at
the Thirty-Eight Conference of the Association: "[P]ar une s6rie de trait~s
conclus d'Etat i Etat, se formerait une s6rie de tribunaux internationaux...
de droit priv6 .... " INT'L L. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE THIRTY-EIGHaT CONFER-
ENCE 77 (1938). The Hungarian suggestion in 1934 was for "an Inter-
national Tribunal for civil matters competent for litigious civil matters be-
tween a private individual and a foreign State or between private individuals
having their domicile in different States. The French conception [in 1934]
advocates the creation of a mixed tribunal set up always by two States only
and competent for differences between those two States or between one State
and a subject of the other or between subjects of the respective States. Pro-
fessor de La Pradelle has a regional solution in view. No doubt it is easier
to create regional organizationm than universal ones." Id. at 79. (Emphasis
added.) Compare INrER-PARLIAMENTIARY UNION Doc. No. C/EF/58/5
(Ext) 4 (1958).
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Britain, Ireland, Israel; (6) South and Central America (excluding
Mexico); (7) North American continent (including Mexico)4
Some of these regions may be cumbersome or either not geo-
graphically contiguous or ethnically similar. This may be inevitable
to a degree; in any event, they are not intended to be inflexible.
If experience and further reflection should indicate the desirability
of different groupings, those should prevail.
The important points are to form reasonably compatible groups
of states-following geographic and ethnic lines where feasible.
Each group should have at least a modicum of economic, political
and cultural ties. It should be able to give a component state a
feeling of basic confidence in the fairness with which its disputes
will be approached. To iterate, if the regions suggested above do
not do this, others should be formed.
With these concepts as a background let us look at: (1) a brief
conspectus and the present status of arbitration generally, and of
trade and investment disputes specifically; and (2) suggestions for
transnational arbitration of investment disputes.
CONSPECTUS AND PRESENT STATUS
Arbitration as a procedure goes back to the time of the ancient
Greeks. Not only was there resort to arbitration, but as well, trea-
ties by which parties agreed to submit future disputes to arbitration.
It was, however, the latter part of the eighteenth century before
arbitration was regarded as a practical method for resolving con-
troversies; and it was the eve of the twentieth century (Hague Peace
Conference of 1899) before it was recognized as a formal interna-
tional procedure.
The Hague Conference created a Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion-a misnomer since it is simply a panel of arbitrators (four of
whom are selected by each signatory state) from which ad hoc
arbitral tribunals may be formed.2" Arbitration before this "court"
is confined to disputes involving states as parties; individuals-
actual or legal-may not be parties. (In any event, the Permanent
"' The writer has previously suggested a tribunal for south and southeast
Asia (including Australia and New Zealand), another for Africa, a third for
Europe, a fourth for South and Central America (excluding Mexico), and
a fifth for the North American continent (including Mexico). Snyder,
supra note 6, at 490. Further reflection indicates that this grouping does
not seem as workable as the one suggested in the text.2 FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 514-15 (3d ed. 1948).
[Vol. 40
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Court of Arbitration has been little used; observers do not foresee
greater use in the future in its present form.)
At the Hague Conference of 1907 a "Draft Convention Relative
to the creation of a Judicial Arbitration Court" was prepared. This
tribunal was to be permanent in fact; but it foundered-among other
reasons--on a method of selection of the permanent arbitrators. 26
In addition, an international prize court was created by this
conference. It savored slightly of an arbitral tribunal for settlement
of commercial, although not investment, disputes (i.e., those which
result from capture of merchant ships and commercial cargoes by
belligerents in time of war). The difficult question of selection of
arbitrators was solved by allowing greater powers to have arbitrators
on the tribunal at all times and smaller powers periodically. (They
were rotated so that the higher the political rank of the state, the
longer the term of the arbitrator selected by it.)27 Significantly this
tribunal was never formed because states took the position that
maritime law was too vague and uncertain to permit meaningful
decisions based on it.28
For several centuries there has been arbitration of transnational
trade disputes. But one of the first (if not the first) organized
arbitral agencies established in modern international trade was the
London Court of Arbitration established in 1892. The Court of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (with head-
quarters in Paris) was established in 1923. And the American
Arbitration Association was organized in 1926. They all function
vigorously today.
As well, there are facilities for arbitration of transnational trade
disputes in Australia, Union of South Africa, Japan, India, Pakistan,
Canada, the countries of South America, Russia and other com-
munist states.29 Today an increasing number of transnational con-
tracts contain a provision for arbitration of disputes arising out of
or relating to the contract. The arbitration is conducted according
to rules promulgated by one of these bodies.8 0
The Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Com-
20 Id. at 517.
27 Id. at 517-18.
'
811d. at 518.
.Domke, International Arbitration of Comnmercial Disputes, in PRIVATE
IvEsTmENTs ABROAD 131, 146-49 (1960).
" INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION 5 (1960).
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merce (world-wide in scope) is an administrative body providing:
(1) facilities for selection of independent arbitrators of standing
and competence; (2) administrative machinery for arbitration; and
(3) rules of procedure. Because of its connection with the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce, newly developing countries have
been reluctant to make use of it, even when there was need for them
to do so.
The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission of the All-Union
Chamber of Commerce in Moscow (there are similar bodies in all
communist countries) could not be expected to have reason to arbi-
trate transnational investment disputes; communists have made it
clear there will be no private investment by foreign investors in a
communist state.
This is arbitration machinery in being; it is presently devoted to
arbitration of trade disputes but its jurisdiction could be extended
to investment disputes. What suggestions have been made for
more extensive transnational arbitration of investment disputes?
And what is being done to implement those suggestions?
SUGGESTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATIONS
Organs of the United Nations have been active in this field. Two
of them-Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
(ECAFE) and Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), how-
ever, are primarily concerned with trade, not investment, disputes.
There is no reason, nonetheless, why those commissions could not
extend their inquiries to arbitration of investment disputes."'
ECE has prepared a draft convention on arbitration of interna-
tional trade disputes. It encompasses only member countries of
ECE and is not concerned with disputes to which a state is a party-
it applies to disputes between "physical or legal persons." It was
opened for signature April 21, 1961; the members of ECE imply
that there are reasonable grounds for believing it may go into effect.32
" For a fuller discussion of this, see Snyder, supra note 6, at 483-85.
" U.N. Doc. No. E/ECE/423, at 2 (1961): "Subject to Article II, para-
graph 2 of the Convention [relating to right of 'legal persons of public law'
to conclude a valid arbitration agreement] and to paragraph 13 of this Final
Act [providing that Benelux countries are free not to apply convention in
whole or in part in their relations with each other], the delegations taking part
in the negotiation of the European Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration [Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg,
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,
[Vol. 40
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A careful reading of this draft convention persuades that it has
neither the scope nor depth of an arbitration convention envisaged
by the writer.
ECAFE is being aided in its work (which seems to have an
excellent opportunity to be crowned with success) by the General
Legal Division of the United Nations. There is an important area
of common interest among member states of ECAFE; and some,
at least, feel a need for encouraging enlightened private foreign
investment.,
Fairly extensive and thoughtful work has been conducted by the
Economic and Social Council (EcoSoc). After careful consideration,
EcoSoc reluctantly concluded there is little chance for widespread
acceptance of a multilateral investment protection code in the fore-
seeable future. 4 It suggests arbitration of controversies between
capital importing states and private foreign investors. It tends to
favor "a special arbitration tribunal or panel, of outstanding neu-
trality and expertise, perhaps under the United Nations' auspices,
on a regional basis. . .. 5
It intimates that an individual investor should have access to
the arbitration tribunal as a disputant rather than having to persuade
his government to espouse his claim. It points out that this arrange-
ment
would greatly enhance the value of the agreement to [the
individual foreign investor]. Moreover, governments of
capital-receiving countries which are apprehensive of the
intervention of foreign governments in their disputes with
foreign investors might well prefer arbitration agreements
under which the latter remain the active party in interest
throughout the proceedings.36
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia] declare that their re-
spective countries do not intend to make any reservations to the Convention."
" See, e.g., address by the Prime Minister of Malaya, United Nations
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, March 5, 1958.
"U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 63-81.
"5 Id. at 81. For an interesting, earlier suggestion on how to cope with
international commerce (which perhaps included, on the relatively small scale
then extant, what the writer calls transnational investment) by a Hungarian
publicist, see INT'L L. Ass'N, REPORT OF THE THIRTY-EIGHT CONFERENCE 82
(Budapest 1934): "The ideal from the standpoint of International Lav and
commerce would be: unification of laws as far as possible, impartial applica-
tion of these laws by regular State Tribunals, enforcement of the judgment
of these Tribunals in foreign countries, and an international Court of Appeal."
" U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 79-81.
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The General Assembly has taken no action on this proposal
although the Secretary-General accorded it a favorable reception
at an EcoSoc ministerial-level meeting in June 1960. He said,
"[O]ne should not exclude the possibility that some facilities, if
only of a modest nature, for international arbitration in matters of
foreign investments, might develop under the aegis of the Organi-
zation, or linked with the Organization.1 7  There is no reason to
believe, however, that the United Nations (or any of its organs)
will vigorously pursue this approach. It has been suggested that
the UN will, in all probability, prepare a list of arbitrators chosen
from both capital exporting and importing countries; these will be
available for ad hoc arbitral tribunals to resolve foreign investment
disputes. It is not presently contemplated that arbitration will be
institutionalized; no multilateral convention to formalize rules of
procedure is envisaged. In short, the UN is pursuing a cautious
program with a modest goal-wisely, many will assert, in order to
avoid frustrating disappointment when ideal solutions and attain-
ment of goals prove impossible.
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(World Bank) provides in its loan regulations-applicable to both
member governments and borrowers other than member govern-
ments-for arbitration of controversies between parties to loan agree-
ments (the bank, borrower and guarantor)8 As well, the bank
has lent its "good offices" for resolution of international disputes.89
The difficulty, on the one hand, is that this arbitration applies only
to those who borrow from the bank; on the other, the bank is not
enthusiastically seeking further opportunities to solve vexed trans-
national disputes.
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
has prepared a draft of a uniform law on arbitration in respect of
" This quotation is taken from a mimeographed paper sent to the writer by
Lord Shawcross, a member of the Association for the Protection of Private
Foreign Investments Directing Committee. Lord Shawcross is a vocal pro-
ponent of an efficacious system of protection for private foreign investment.
This paper appeared as an article in a Pakistan newspaper at the time of the
International Businessmen's Conference (sponsored by the International
Chamber of Commerce), at Karachi, Pakistan, December 5-8, 1960.
"IBRD, Loan Regs. 3, 4, §§ 7.03-.04 (1961).
Its most publicized step in this direction was in resolving the contro-
versy that evolved from nationalization of the Suez Canal; less publicized,
but equally effective perhaps, was resolution of the dispute between the city




international relations of private law.4" This has, however, been
revised by the Council of Europe; the revised draft is being used as
a basis for a draft law by a committee of experts named by the
Council.4
Both the United States and United Kingdom have provided for
arbitration of disputes arising out of their bilateral treaties of friend-
ship, commerce and navigation (commerce, establishment and navi-
gation, they are called by the United Kingdom) with submission of
the disputes to the International Court of Justice if arbitration is
not pursued.42 The ambit of this arbitration is patently narrow.
As has been pointed out previously,4" the International Bar Asso-
ciation (IBA), the International Association for the Promotion and
Protection of Private Foreign Investments (APPI), the British
Parliamentary Group for World Government (BPGWG), and the
International Law Association (ILA)-all organizations that have
some standing and influence in the international community-have
either suggested or prepared draft conventions for transnational
arbitration of foreign investment disputes.
A permanent slightly similar institution in being is the Court of
Justice of the European Communities. It is not, of course, an
arbitral tribunal; it represents, however, a successful, supranational,
tangential development. It was established in 1958 to adjudicate
disputes arising out of activities in the European Coal and Steel
Community, Euratom, and more recently, the European Economic
Community. It was preceded by the Court of Justice of the Coal and
Steel Community which had been in existence since 1953." 4 But
these are relatively small inroads or unimplemented suggestions on
an urgent, vexing problem. More needs to be done.45
" International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Unification
of Private Law 1954, Draft 111(3).
,x Letter From the Secretary-General, Council of Europe, to the writer,
July 11, 1961.
See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Japan,
April 2, 1953, art. 24, [1953] 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2063, 2080, T.I.A.S. No.
2863; Treaty of Commerce, Establishment and Navigation Between the
United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, March 11, 1959, art. 32, CMiD. No.
698, at 20 (T.S. No. 1 of 1959).
,I Note 16 supra.
"' Donner, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, in LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN
FREE TRADE AssOCIATION 66 (1961); see also Note, The Court of Justice of
the European Communities, 10 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 337 (1961).
"' Compare Peck, Our Changing Law, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 27, 32 (1957):
"[C]ommercial litigation has substantially left the courts," with Fuller,
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Specifically, in the writer's view, a system of regional arbitral
tribunals for resolution of foreign investment disputes must be estab-
lished. And-for reasons that will be made clear later-a single
appellate arbitral tribunal to which appeal from awards of the
regional tribunals may lie, is necessary. Moreover, the regional
tribunals should be institutionalized in regional conventions; and
the appellate tribunal should be institutionalized in an ecumenical-
or as near ecumenical as possible-convention.
What are the obstacles in the path of these suggestions? Are
these obstacles insuperable? What solutions may be possible?
OBSTACLES
There are obvious pragmatic difficulties.
First: newly developing states simply do not want to submit
their foreign investment disputes to impartial arbitration. They are
in a headlong dash to industrialize and modernize; they want nothing
to stand in the way of a successful, speedy achievement of this goal.
Moreover, impartial arbitration smacks of giving away some of their
newly acquired sovereignty; this is anathema."6
Second: private international law is complex and tortuous; its
substantive content is not free from dispute. Arbitration, of course,
is not inflexibly bound by law and should (with regard to trans-
national investment disputes) be less bound in the future in a
way the writer will point out. But to the extent that law is an
ancient, tested standard keeping pace with solution of contemporary
problems (and only to this extent, it is submitted), arbitral awards
should not consistently fly in the face of rational legal concepts.
Third: even when there is provision for arbitration today, parties
attempt to evade it if there is means of evasion and it is in their
supra note 19, at 637: "[I]n the field of commercial law the British courts in
recent years have, if I may say so, fallen into a 'law-is-law' formalism ....
[C]ommercial cases are increasingly being taken to arbitration." The diffi-
culty, of course, is compounded in the transnational area. There are no
courts to adjudicate "commercial litigation" and "commercial cases."
"' Compare Stone, Law, Force & Survival, 39 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 549, 553
(1961): "That these new states desire to maintain the utmost freedom of
action in respect to their legal obligations is not only the common reaction
of a debtor; it is also an expression of pride in their new-won sovereignty
and of felt responsibility for its economic fate and standard of living of their
peoples. . . . [I]t [leaves] them more room for maneuver, to resort to a
variety of extra-legal pressures on the creditor to surrender his rights. These
may range from requests for re-negotiation, repudiation, hostile propaganda




interest to do so. A well-known example is the arbitration provision
in which each party agrees to appoint an arbitrator; the umpire, in
turn is to be appointed either by the two arbitrators or the two par-
ties together, after the arbitrators have been appointed. One party
simply fails to appoint an arbitrator. There is no provision in the
arbitration clause or agreement for appointment of an arbitrator in
this event. Arbitration is impossible.
Fourth: some international jurists tend to regard arbitration as
primarily a diplomatic procedure. To attempt to institutionalize
it, to them, is heresy.47 The fact that not only the pace but the
character of the world has changed rapidly in the last two decades,
does not appear to disturb an adamant refusal to modernize their
concept of arbitration.
Fifth: there are vexing basic arbitral problems if arbitration is
not carefully institutionalized. For example, the inviolability of
the undertaking to arbitrate and the form of the compromise; the
arbitrability of the dispute; the composition of the arbitral tribunal;
the immutability of the tribunal once it has been formed; procedure
before the tribunal; interpretation and annulment of the award and
what to do about revision, in a proper case;48 and exhaustion of local
remedies. All these problems could be satisfactorily resolved, it is
submitted, if arbitration were institutionalized.
A difficult problem arises because parties sometimes attempt to
evade enforcement of an arbitral award after it has been rendered.49
'"U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add. 1, at 2 (1958).
"
8 Id. at 1-12.
" Enforcement is a vast, complex subject having a body of knowledge of
its own. A study-or even a conspectus--of it is beyond the reach of this
article. For excellent references to, and bibliographies on, the subject, see
AMERIcAN ARBITRATION Ass'N, ARBITRATION BIBLIOGRAPHY (1954); INT'L
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (1949, Supp. No. 1, 1951); INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ARBITRATION 296-311 (Domke ed. 1958); 1 ScHOENKE, DIE SCHIEDS-
GERICHTSBARKEIT IN ZIVIL-UND HANDELSSACHEN IN EUROPA (1944); 3
SCHOENKE & KEILWEIN, DIE SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN ZIVIL-UND
HANDELSSACHEN IN EUROPA (1956); SzLADITs, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON FOREIGN
AND COMPARATIVE LAW 319-23 (1955); UNION INTERNATIONALE DES Avo-
CATS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1956). For an interesting
example of a difference of opinion on even a minor, non-technical aspect of
enforcement of awards in international trade disputes, compare Carabiber,
Conditions of Development of International Commercial Arbitration, in IN-
TERNATIONAL TR_ ARBITRATION 149, 163 (Domke ed. 1958): "In this
connection, it should be added that the private character of arbitration elimi-
nates the possibility of statistics and consequently it is not generally known
that 85% of arbitral awards are voluntarily complied with," with Mat-
teucci, Utopia and Reality in the Realm of Arbitration, in id. at 189, 190:
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No enforcement procedures of the sort known to a mature municipal,
civil, juridical system are feasible transnationally at this juncture
in world history. Moreover, the world climate is such that even the
World Bank-admittedly in a strong position as a successful dispu-
tant in an arbitration proceeding-is reluctant to proceed against
an adversary against whom an arbitral award has been made with
those enforcement procedures currently available to it."
At present, varying principles of law in different countries in the
world as well as tortuous court procedures render enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards uncertain, time-consuming and expensive.
If there were a definitive world legal order and an executive (or
other properly constituted force) to back it up, a different situation
might prevail.
The Geneva' Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards of 1927 was a step in the direction of resolving the enforce-
ment problem. It gave arbitral awards some status and respecta-
bility; but because it smacked of giving up a certain amount of
sovereignty, most states refused to sign or adhere to it. Moreover,
the convention was not completely effective in aiding enforcement.
Technical inadequacies gave those desiring to evade enforcement
adequate opportunity for doing so; they were either able to per-
suade courts not to enforce arbitral awards, or they interminably
delayed enforcement actions to the point where the expense and time
consumed made ultimate enforcement an uneconomical proposition.
In May 1958 the UN convoked an international diplomatic
conference to consider a new convention on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. This convention (drawn
up by representatives of forty-five countries) was signed by twenty-
three countries within the period it was open for signature (until
December 31, 1958) and ratified by about half that number.5'
With respect to those states which sign or accede to this con-
"Unfortunately the willingness of parties to submit to arbitration is not
matched by the willingness of a losing party to comply with an adverse
award." The weight of informed view seems to favor the former position,
however. See, e.g., Schachter, The Enforcement of International Judicial
and Arbitral Decisions, 54 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1960).
"oBRITISH PARLIAMENTARY GROUP FOR WORLD GOVERNMENT, A WORLD
INVESTMENT CONVENTION? 19-20 (1959).
" INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION 5 (1960) ; Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Na-
tions Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1060 (1961).
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vention, enforcement of foreign arbitral awards will become more
certain, less time-consuming, less expensive. Generally speaking,
once an award has been made, the burden of proof lies on the party
against whom it is to be enforced to show that it should not be
enforced rather than on the party attempting to enforce it to show
that it should be enforced. There are certain specified grounds on
which enforcement may be refused; absent those grounds, the arbi-
tral award is enforced.52
Assuming that world opinion-at least as exemplified by the
states involved-progresses to the point of permitting institutional-
izing enforcement of an arbitral award, the problem may be satis-
factorily resolved. Enforcement could be institutionalized by in-
cluding provisions, similar to those in the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards, in
the convention establishing each regional tribunal; or by a provision
incorporating the former into each arbitration convention-which-
ever better accomplishes the desired result and seems simpler.
But at least two other obstacles remain. First, a paucity of
arbitral awards5 s and second, a lack (with an even greater potential
lack) of uniformity of arbitral awards (in controversies involving
foreign investments). To put the latter another way: there is no
generally accepted transnational standard of protection for foreign
property;54 there is bound to be lack of uniformity of awards ren-
" See Quigley, supra note 51, at 1066-71.
"
8But see U.N. Doc. No. E/AC.6/SR.282, at 10 (1960): "[F]rom a
practical point of view, the certainty that disputes concerning the treatment of
investors can be submitted to the judgment of arbitrators is even more im-
portant than the establishment of fixed rules for such treatment."
' Compare remarks of Professor Louis B. Sohn, at the American Society
of International Law regional meeting on March 2, 1961, in AM. Soc'Y INr'L
L., REPORT OF THE Naw YoRK REGIONAL MEETING 9 (1961): "I would like
to make an assertion that there is an international standard and that the
standard has been observed for 150 to 200 years; or at least, there was an
international standard until recently. We have slight doubts about it at this
point," with those of Dr. Jorge Castaneda, Legal Adviser, Permanent
Mission of Mexico to the United Nations, in id. at 11: "On the subject of the
minimum standard: This question does not seem to me to be absolutely clear
and evident.... It is true that very many international decisions have recog-
nized the existence of the minimum standard, but it is also true that many
other international awards and decisions have also recognized the existence
of another rule that seems to run counter to the minimum standard, namely,
the rule that foreigners cannot claim more rights than nationals." See
Fatouros, Legal Security for International Investment, in LEGAL AsPECTS OF
FOREIGN INvESTMENT 699 (Friedmann & Pugh eds. 1959); U.N. Doc. No.
E/3492, at 70-80, 89-92 (1961); U.N. Doc. No. E/3325, at 35-62, 65-66.
ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, PRINCIPLES CONCERN-
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dered by ad hoc tribunals in these disputes. To put the former
another way: there is no well-rounded body of precedent enunciated
by arbitral tribunals which have made awards in foreign investment
disputes. 5
This is true simply because disputes concerning foreign invest-
ment have not previously been thoroughly arbitrated although there
have been some ad hoc tribunals that have made awards in this field.
These awards have been largely based on general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.
Two recent examples of arbitral awards of this kind are those
between: (1) the Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd.,
and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi in 1951 ;"' and (2) the Ruler of Qatar
and the International Marine Oil Company in 1953.,' Both dealt
with oil concessions.
In the Abu Dhabi case, the sole arbitrator first held that the
agreement was not governed by the municipal law of any country. 8
Then he based his award on "principles rooted in the good sense
and common practice of the generality of civilized nations-a sort of
'modem law of nature.' "59
In the Ruler of Qatar arbitration the referee held that the arbi-
tration was not governed by municipal law, but by "principles of
justice, equity and good conscience." 60
The difficulty with the bases of these awards-many interna-
tional jurists assert-is that general principles of law of the nature
relied on in these two arbitrations are imprecise and difficult to
authoritatively ascertain." Although reliance on them may seem
ING ADMISSION AND TREATMENT OF ALIENS (1961), provides at articles 11
and 12 that an alien may acquire, hold and dispose of property "subject to
local laws ... [and] conditions imposed for his admission" and that a state
may nationalize or expropriate his property on payment of compensation
measured "in accordance with local laws, regulations and orders."
" For the advantages of this situation, see text at note 20 supra.
" Petroleum Dev. Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, [1951] Int'l L. Rep. 144(No. 37).
Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co., [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 534.
The applicable clause of this agreement, article 17, stated: "The Ruler
and the Company both declare that they intend to execute this Agreement in
a spirit of good intentions and integrity, and to interpret it in a reasonable
manner." [1951] Int'l L. Rep. at 148.59Id. at 149.
60 [1953] Int'l L. Rep. at 545.
6' Research in this field is being carried on but it will be an extended
period before anything usable in the practicable world of transnational litiga-
tion and arbitration will be available. See Hazard, The General Principles
of Law, 52 Am. J. INTL' L. 92 (1958) ; Schlesinger, Research on the General
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superficially attractive it does not commend itself for widespread
acceptance.
There is a lack of uniformity of awards for three main reasons.
First, there are few precedents; as stated above, the transnational
standard of protection for foreign property is controversial and
unsettled. Second (this is an effect of the first), arbitral tribunals
rendering awards in the past have arrived at divergent decisions on
similar facts; indeed, some of them have arrived at virtually opposite
decisions on similar facts. Third, there has been no appellate arbi-
tral tribunal, one of whose functions would have been to reconcile
divergent views of arbitral tribunals of first instance and aid in
establishing reasonable uniformity of awards.
There is no reason to believe (in any future system of ad hoc
tribunals) that arbitral tribunals of first instance will not continue to
arrive at divergent decisions on similar facts; sometimes, of course,
decisions may be contra.
Taking the first obstacle (paucity of awards) first-its solution
is not easy nor foolproof. Indeed, there is no a priori solution. One
aspect of it has been previously pointed out by the writer. 2 But
another aspect is an interesting and challenging one. It should
appeal to those willing to push forward courageously into uncharted
territory. It is this: arbitral tribunals engaged in resolving foreign
investment disputes have an opportunity to fashion a "jurisprudence"
in much the same way pioneering juridical or quasi-juridical bodies
in the past have had to do.6" It is a challenge which requires the apt
welding of theory and reality.
64
Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. 734
(1957.) In any event it might perhaps be less offensive to newly developing
nations if the phrase "principles of justice recognized by the principal legal
systems of the world" were used instead of "general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations." See, e.g., use of the former phrase in Draft Con-
vention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens,
in 55 AMt. J. INT'L L. 548 (1961).
" Snyder, Protection of Private Foreign Investment: Examination and
Appraisal, 10 INT'L & Comn'. L.Q. 469, 491 (1961): "[T]he basic void is
lack of respected, competent regional arbitral tribunals able to arbitrate
government-foreign investor disputes."
" Domke, International Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, in PRIVATE
INVESTMENTS ABROAD 131, 177 (1960) : "Since a substantive law of foreign
investment has not yet been developed, determination by fact-finding and
decision-making bodies may become the primary source for the development
of an international economic law of foreign investment."
" Compare Dn VIsscnrER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW xi passint (Corbett transl. 1957); RUBIN, PRIVATE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 4 (1956): "International law, if it is to be a meaningful guide
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This solution, of course, begs the question for those who in-
flexibly demand that a full-blown, substantive transnational standard
for protection of foreign investment must precede effective arbitra-
tion. The sober truth is that there is an irreconcilable cleavage
between newly developing countries and private foreign investors on
a minimum standard for protection of foreign investment. 5
A workable solution appears to be a bold forging forward with
decisions based ex aequo et bono in individual cases.,0  The difficulty
of this-in some aspects, at least-is not underrated; but it does not
appear intractable. 7 And it appears almost the only feasible basis
in an area in which the bases for awards are ill-defined."
If arbitral awards were rendered on this basis, one can foresee
to present conduct, must equally reject the isolation of principle from the
test of applicability."
" See note 54 supra. See also Am. Soc'Y INT'L L., REPORT OF TE
NEW YORK REGIONAL MEETING 11-12 (1961) (remarks of Dr. Jorge Casta-
neda) : "There is another interesting aspect to this problem.... Most under-
developed countries would rather tend to feel, I think, that the concept of
the minimum standard was created by the practice of the highly industrialized
nations in the past in their relations with the under-developed countries, in
situations of great inequality, especially in the last century and the beginning
of this century... [N]o matter how you look at the problem and no matter
how you try to explain and justify the minimum standard, a claim by for-
eigners for rights that could be greater than those enjoyed by nationals
amounts to a claim for a privileged and discriminatory position. Discrimi-
nation in reverse, so to speak, discrimination against nationals in their own
country. That is why I believe that the peoples of under-developed countries
will not accept the rule of the minimum standard, because it amounts to
maintaining that international law authorizes these people to be discriminated
against by foreigners in their own countries. This is a very grave matter
of principle, and if one is sufficiently far-sighted, one would realize that in
the end, this will be more important than considerations of immediate eco-
nomic advantage. Possibly in the future, when under-developed countries
are faced with the dilemma of granting a privilege situation to foreigners,
of giving them greater rights than to their own nationals, in return for
immediate economic benefits, some may feel doubts as to what they prefer."
" Compare Snyder, supra note 62, at 491: "Arbitral decisions can be
based ex aequo et bono. Whatever the merits of contra arguments, there
has been successful arbitration in the past where fixed substantive arbitral
rules were lacking." See State Ry. of Wuertemberg v. State Ry. of Hun-
gary, 18 Bulletin des transports internationaux par chemins de fer 375 (No.
17) (Ger. 1909); South German Frontier Ry. v. Administrator of the Swiss
Ry. Ass'n, 5 Bulletin des transports internationaux par chemins de fer 893
(No. 4) (Ger. 1897).
7 As Lord Denning is said to have said: some lawyers find difficulties
for every solution; others find solutions for every difficulty. The important
task is to get the latter type in positions of leadership and where their in-
fluence may be most felt.
" It should be noted that a decision based ex aequo et bono is different
from one based on general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
The Diversion of Water from the Muese, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 70, at 76
(1937) (Opinion of Hudson, J.).
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that perhaps within the next decade after arbitration was begun full
scale, a body of reasonable, reconcilable precedent would begin to
emerge. 9  The answer-like so many in the gray area of law,
sociology, economics and business-lies neither in a blind adherence
to abstract legal theory nor an arrogant assertion of business reality.
Somewhere between the shifting sands of parched pragmatism and
the impotency of pure principle, there is a course which will make
of this facet of transnational law and economics a vital, practical
standard of conduct. But let us come to grips with specifics. How
in pragmatic terms can this be accomplished?
A SOLUTION
The writer's view has been suggested previously in this article.70
To iterate: a system of regional, arbitral tribunals to adjudicate
foreign investment disputes needs to be established. The tribunals
should be ad hoc ones composed of three competent, knowledgeable,
respected arbitrators versed in the field of international law or trans-
national investment or both.7 There should be a permanent secre-
tariat to administer the provisions of the convention establishing
these regional tribunals and to provide services for them. There
should be basic rules of procedure and-equally important-rules of
enforcement of arbitral awards. In short, regional arbitration should
be institutionalized."2
In order to move in the direction of reasonable uniformity of
awards there should be an appellate arbitral tribunal to which appeal
(on other than a question of fact) may lie from an award of a
regional arbitral tribunal. 3 There should, perhaps, be an absolute
" Compare this oft-quoted passage by Professor Paul Freund, written in
another context: "These abstractions, arranged in intransigent hostility like
robot sentinels facing each other across a border, can become useful guardians
on either hand in the climb to truth, if they can be made to march together.
Somehow the lifeblood of the concrete problem tempers the mechanical arro-
gance of abstractions." Freund, Thomas Reed Powell, 69 HARv. L. REV. 800,
802-03 (1956).
70 See text at notes 15-24 supra.
" The "system of selecting . . . [arbitrators should produce] men who
are capable of understanding the nature of the issues, data, and arguments
to be presented, and who have, as a result of the system of selection, or can
obtain from the parties the knowledge necessary to wise decisions." Ment-
schikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 HARv. L. REV. 846, 847 (1961).
7' The writer has prepared a draft convention for establishment of regional
foreign investment arbitral tribunals. It will be published at a later date
with a commentary.
" Compare the review of the United Nations Administrative Tribunals'
awards by the International Court of Justice. The Legal Adviser, UNESCO,
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right of appeal to this appellate tribunal under certain enumerated
circumstances; certainly there should be a privilege of appeal in the
discretion either of: (1) the appellate tribunal; (2) the tribunal
which made the award; or (3) some impartial agency loosely con-
nected with the appellate tribunal. And there should be a procedure
by which the appellate tribunal could decide questions of law certified
for decision by a regional tribunal. This might be considered
analogous to an advisory opinion given by the International Court
of Justice except it would be binding.
Appeal might be by a system similar to that by which appeal lies in
civil cases to: (1) the United States Supreme Court; (2) the House
of Lords in the United Kingdom; or (3) the Cour de Cassation in
France-or, for that matter, the system of appeal in civil cases in
any mature juridical system.
The system should have withstood the test of time and expe-
rience; it should work reasonably well and not be cumbersome. The
important thing is to get a workable system upon which states con-
cerned can agree. There is no reason to believe this problem is
intractable providing states realize that the cost of failure may come
high in the next few decades.
The arbitrators of the appellate tribunal should, it is submitted,
be permanent (at least as opposed to ad hoc) ones. This might be
on a basis similar to that of judges of the International Court of
Justice or the Court of Justice of the European Communities. 4 In
the event they, themselves, examined petitions for appeal, it would
seem not unreasonable to think that nine to twelve arbitrators would
be necessary. In the event another agency examined these petitions,
perhaps six to nine would suffice.
These arbitrators would have to be men of the highest caliber,
competence and knowledge. This, of course, is a clich6 and trite;
but it is nonetheless true and necessary. Some (perhaps half or
has said that this "may encourage the establishment of a unified jurisprudence
in international administrative law." U.N. Doc. No. A /1917/Add. 1, at 3(1955).
"' See Statute of the International Court of Justice arts. 13-24; Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community arts. 165-67. See also
Donner, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, in LEGAL PROB-
LEMS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE EUROPEAN FREE
TRADE AssocIATION 66 (1961) : "The authors of the Treaty departed from
the customary appointment of the judiciary for life in viev of the uncertainty
regarding the evolution of their tasks, although it is to be presumed that, as




approximately so) should be respected international jurists or publi-
cists who also have recognized competence in transnational commer-
cial matters including transnational investment; the remainder should
be respected men in the world of transnational commercial matters,
including transnational investment, who have judicial temperament
and have had experiences as members of a tribunal arbitrating dis-
putes concerning transnational commercial matters or investment
or both.
Now, there are, no doubt, objections-some quite vigorous,
others less so-to these proposals. One of them is that it is "vision-
ary." True, but one might answer that rather imprecise, trite
objection by an equally imprecise, trite retort: these are "visionary"
times. Another is that it is expensive. True, but it is relatively
inexpensive if it will help to maintain a reasonable flow of capital
from those nations having a surplus to those countries needing it.
Another is that arbitrators should be businessmen, nor jurists. There
is merit in this argument. It is the view of the writer that they
should be both businessmen and jurists.75 Still another objection
is that the arbitrators on the regional tribunals should be chosen by
an impartial, objective body (not by the parties to the dispute) from
among a panel of arbitrators. While this plan may be desirable in
some ways, it is probably not necessary or feasible at this juncture
for at least two reasons.
First: it is submitted that the advocacy of a party's view by an
arbitrator is currently somewhat overdrawn when the arbitrator
chosen by the party is a mature, distinguished, respected, knowledge-
able person. In addition, there may be practical factors urging him
to be impartial: (1) whether he is jurist or businessman, he realizes
if he is partial, arbitration becomes a mockery and there may well be
no effective, impartial means of settling similar disputes; (2) if he
is a businessman, he knows there may be an arbitration proceeding
in the future in which he may be a party-he does not want the
system rigged or biased.76
Second: it is submitted that parties themselves would prefer each
to name an arbitrator, at least when the system begins functioning.
Perhaps later when the plan has had a testing period, arbitrators may
See note 71 supra; text at note 20 supra.
Compare Schoonmaker, International Arbitration and the Association
of Food Distributors, in INTERNATIONAL T ADE APBITEATION 259, 266
(Domke ed. 1958).
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be chosen by another method. But initially (when a certain amount
of sovereignty is relinquished, in any event) states may feel that
they would like-and they would like their nationals to have-the
right to appoint one of the three arbitrators.
Moreover, if arbitrators had to be named from members of a
panel selected by parties to a convention establishing a regional tri-
bunal, foreign investors might be wary. This is not to say, how-
ever, that there would be partiality on the part of these arbitrators;
it is simply to say that at this juncture, the imprimatur of impartiality
is as important as actual impartiality. In another half century or
century, this factor may lose most, if not all, of its importance. (For
reasons that are obvious it is not a factor in selection of permanent
arbitrators of a supreme appellate arbitral tribunal.)
This then is a means by which foreign investors and newly
developing countries may resolve disputes concerning foreign in-
vestments. The important, new (perhaps startling, to some inter-
national jurists) suggestions are: (1) to make greater use of
businessmen as arbitrators; and (2) to base awards ex aequo et
bono. (Perhaps two of the arbitrators on a three-man tribunal
should be businessmen; on the appellate tribunal, perhaps half.) In
the writer's view this is the most feasible way to gain widespread
acceptance and use of arbitral tribunals by foreign investors and
newly developing nations. Investors, it is submitted, are not going
to agree to arbitrate a dispute involving vital interests as long as
they feel the award depends on the thinking of (they assert) archaic,
inflexible, unrealistic minds-in short, academically oriented, tradi-
tional international jurists. 77
Newly developing states, it is submitted, are not going to agree
to arbitrate a dispute involving vital interests as long as they feel
the decision depends on (they assert) archaic, inflexible, unrealistic
standards-in short, international law which they did not help to
shape.78
"' Compare Mentschikoff, supra note 71, at 846-47, 857, 859-60. The
writer's draft convention for establishment of a regional foreign investment
arbitral tribunal provides: "Each arbitrator and the umpire shall be a person
of recognized competence in international law or international commercial
matters (including international investment), or both." The writer intends
that the permanent arbitrators of his proposed Supreme Appellate Arbitral
Tribunal be half businessmen and half jurists, or approximately so.
"' See, e.g., note 65 supra; Porter, Multilateral Protection of Foreign
Investment, 3 INT'L DEVELOPMENT REV. 2-3, 26 (1961): "A widely held view
was expressed by the Mexican representative, Senor Castaneda: nearly half
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These proposals are not a complete answer to the problem of
maintaining a reasonable flow of investment capital to newly de-
veloping countries. In operation, however, they may serve as a
greater part of that answer than appears at first blush. It may be
that the certainty that disputes concerning foreign investment will
be fairly and expeditiously resolved will, on the one hand, encourage
foreign investors to invest in newly developing countries; and on the
other, it may encourage those countries to be more thoughtful in
their treatment of foreign investment.
CONCLUSION
What if we fail to maintain a reasonable flow of investment
capital to newly developing nations? What is the alternative? One
does not know certainly, of course. But if the past is a harbinger of
the future (and historians assert it is, without doubt) the conse-
quences may be the end of western civilization, as we know it.
Throughout history, civilizations have flourished, withered and
died. This was not because a particular civilization lacked material
resources, affluence, means; but rather because of a loss of confi-
dence, motivation, will. To be more precise, it was because of an
of the nations represented in the United Nations have come into being since
the main body of international law was formulated; they question their obli-
gation to be bound by rules which they had not helped to create." Contra,
Domke, Foreign Nationalizations, 55 AM. J. IN''L L. 585 (1961) : "Inter-
national law, far from being an outgrowth of only Western concepts, is in-
deed an expression of fundamental embodied in long established legal systems
throughout the world. Islamic law, for instance, which is of real significance
for one sixth of the world population, in the Middle East, Pakistan, Southern
Asia and parts of Africa clearly embodies the universal maxim of the pro-
tection of acquired rights."
The writer's draft convention for establishment of a regional foreign
investment arbitral tribunal provides that unless the parties to the arbitration
proceeding agree otherwise, the tribunal decides a dispute referred to it ex
aequo et bono. But if a party alleges that the conduct of the other, or
another, party constitutes a breach of international law, the tribunal may
adjudicate this issue at the same time it adjudicates issues decided ex
aequo et bono. The writer submits that the view that this precludes rea-
sonable uniformity of awards is overdrawn; but in any event, inflexible
uniformity in any justiciable matter must give way to justice in a particular
case. Compare Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV.
L. REv. 173, 192-93 (1933), in which a method of determining applicable
legal concepts is suggested in a conflict of laws problem that "would not be
the result of the automatic operation of a rule or principle of selection but
of a search for a just decision in the principal case"; JEssuP, TRANS-
NATioNAL LAW 106 (1956): "There is no inherent reason why a judicial
tribunal, whether national or international, should not be authorized to choose
from all these bodies of law the rules considered to be most in conformity
with reason and justice for the solution in any particular controversy."
1962]
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inability to come to grips with and solve a crucial problem affecting
the basis of that civilization.
An apposite example is the Chinese civilization in the eighteenth
century. It was self-reliant, buoyant, affluent and universally ac-
claimed. Voltaire, the French philosopher and author, character-
ized it as the perfection of "moral science"; Leibnitz, the German
philosopher, praised it highly.
The unfortunate truth is that the Chinese considered members
of western civilization to be barbarians. Chinese civilization scorn-
fully brushed aside every foreign thing as demeaning and contempt-
ible; it tried to ignore Europe. It was supremely confident and
wealthy. Within one hundred years western entrepreneurs and
governments controlled the economic and political life of the Chinese
people. A new form of civilization-in the modern idiom, a new
ideology-had overwhelmed and supplanted the supremely confi-
dent and wealthy Chinese civilization. The industrialized non-
communist world today stands in a position analogous to that of the
Chinese civilization of the eighteenth century. It is affluent as never
before in history. All things considered, it is confident of the
superiority of its way of life.
But what if it fails to face the challenge of industrializing the
newly developing nations? Is the noncommunist world's inability
to face up to the challenge of private foreign investment and its pro-
tection to lead to loss of confidence, affluence and, ultimately, free-
dom? Is it possible that western civilization as we know it today
will pass into oblivion?
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